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The Great War of Words
Tim Cook
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World War I (HarperCollins Publishers, 2001)
Gary Sheffield, Forgotten Victory. The First World War: Myth and
Realities (Headline Book Publishing, 2001).

T

he Great War was a cataclysmic
event that dismantled Empires,
transformed the nature of warfare,
and produced a final butcher’s bill of
more than ten million dead and twice
that many wounded and maimed.
With the war raging for more than four
years and involving, by its end, almost
every country in the world, its legacy
continues to be debated more than eighty years
on. Two scholars, one an American professor of
English, John Mosier, and the second, a British
professor of War Studies, Gary Sheffield, have
recently offered new and ambitious overviews of
the Great War.
John Mosier’s The Myth of the Great War
commences with an introductory passage on how
the conflict has been misunderstood over the last
eighty years. There is no doubt that the Great War
has unleashed a great war of words over the last
century, and not all of them useful, but one always
grimaces when an author claims to reveal a “great
deal that has been ignored or suppressed by other
historians.” (Preface). Since Mosier offers some
questionable statements in his notes on sources,
it would seem, however, that he too has only a
tenuous grasp on the historiography.
Mosier’s provocative series of theses are that the
United States saved the Allied war effort after
Britain and France had bungled their way through
almost four years of fruitless campaigns; that the
Germans were consistently victorious in battle;
and that the Allies, in order to cover up their
gross incompetence, willfully misrepresented
their operational failures. Astonishing to this
reviewer, others have described this book as
thought-provoking. That may be a statement
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applied to revisionist histories such as
this, but it is also a phrase that reviewers
sometimes use when they are unsure
about the validity of the conclusions
and arguments. Those with a passing
interest may indeed find Mosier’s book
thought-provoking, but those who have
studied the war in detail will only find
it aggravating and inept history of the
worst kind. There are problems with The Myth
of the Great War at every turn: it is poorly
structured, promises but fails to offer convincing
conclusions, and contains countless errors of fact
and interpretation.
In this supposed general history of the war,
there are bizarre gaps. For instance, there are
two detailed chapters on France and Germany
at the beginning of the book, but nothing on
Russia, Italy, Austria-Hungary, and only the
briefest of references to Great Britain. Having
chosen to ignore most of the major belligerents,
the next chapter starts in August 1914. There is
also no attempt to outline the complex factors
that led to war, an area of scholarship that has
been pregnant with detailed studies in the last
two decades. This type of episodic narrative
is prevalent throughout the book: Mosier has
decided to tell only parts of the story. While it is
fully acknowledged that all authors must limit
the extent of their coverage, Mosier seems only
to highlight those historical events that show the
British Expeditionary Force (BEF) or the French
Armies in the worst possible light. The historical
narrative is episodic, unbalanced, and, for the
most part, unfair.
One of Mosier’s key points of contention
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is the untrustworthy
contemporary
documentary and
statistical evidence
issued by the Allies.
Having examined the
propaganda of the
time, Mosier observes
that it, not surprising
for nations engaged in
death struggles, was
untruthful. Indeed it
was, but Mosier seems
blissfully unaware that
historians have written
for decades about the
flawed nature of the
wartime propaganda discourse. To use an
account from a British or French newspaper (or
German for that matter, although Mosier never
does), and to call it biased and obfuscating is
not terribly revealing. Having set up straw-man
arguments, Mosier knocks them down, and
then claims an original interpretation of the war.
Mosier is continually drawing conclusions that
he suggests are new, which in fact have been in
print for years.
This weak historical approach is endemic
throughout The Myth of the Great War, but
few sections are so partisan as the assessment
of the fighting efficiency of the national armies.
Desperate to support his thesis on the superiority
of German soldiers, Mosier ignores anything
that might disprove his case. The question of the
French and German bloodbath at Verdun in 1916
is a strong case in point where Mosier presents
the German operations as a tour de force. The
nearly equal casualties by the end of the tenmonth battle, to say nothing of the unending
horror of the fighting as depicted by countless
frontline soldiers, both French and German,
should have been enough to rattle Mosier’s
assumptions. They do no such thing, and so
his conclusions of the fighting and aftermath
at Verdun are among the most ludicrous in the
book, and perhaps in print (225).
While the French are held up as incompetents
slaughtered at the hands of the German elite
army, so too are the British. At every turn, Mosier
attempts to denigrate the BEF. Mosier writes,
for example, that the March Offensive “virtually
finished [the BEF] as an offensive force” (319).
Mosier can posit such ludicrous statements
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since he misunderstands and downplays the
string of British operational victories in the
Last Hundred Days. As part of his argument
that no British force had ever made “any
real gains other than what was fabricated by
propagandists,” Mosier might well cast his eyes
to the Canadian Corps, which fought as part of
the BEF, and their victories at Vimy Ridge (April
1917), Hill 70 (August 1917) and Passchendaele
(October-November 1917). But it was not just the
Canadians who succeeded in battle and it is clear
that many British units, and not just elite ones,
were, by the last half year of the war, continually
driving the Germans from their entrenched
positions on the Western Front. Unfortunately,
that would not fit into Mosier’s thesis of the inept
Allied forces, and so it is conveniently left out.
But even Mosier seems quite at a loss to explain
how this German army of super-soldiers could
have been defeated on the field of battle. Instead
of rethinking his anti-British stance, he simply
ignores the contradictory evidence that effectively
undercuts his flawed thesis.
Having unconvincingly denigrated the fighting
efficiency of the Allied armies and presented
mundane observations about the propaganda of
the time, Mosier overplays his hand in arguing
that the Americans won the war. There is no
doubt that the Americans had a very important
psychological impact on the German High
Command after their troops began to cross
the Atlantic in greater numbers towards the
end of 1917, but their tactical impact on the
battlefield was not nearly as important. Mosier
offers no distinction, instead arguing that the
Americans won the war through their battlefield
exploits. However, Pershing certainly did not have
command over “most
of the Allied fighting
strength” by July 1918,
and there are few
who still believe that
Pershing was the leader
of men that Mosier
purports, elevating
him to a position that
was “unique among the
senior commanders
of the war” (306-7).
There is no doubt that
the Americans had a
significant impact on
the war, but Mosier
offers no new evidence
35
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to convince the reader that they won the war for
the Allies.
In the end, Mosier supports none of the claims
that he promises in his introduction; instead,
this is a rehashing of outdated, superseded
concepts that fails to push the historiography
in new directions. Moreover, as an overview
summary it is so unbalanced and prejudicial in
its assessments that readers must be alerted to
its complete unreliability as a useful historical
text.
Gary Sheffield’s Forgotten Victory is a much
stronger work and a valuable contribution in
appraising and summarizing the new Great War
scholarship. As a professor of War Studies at
King College and a leading expert on land warfare
in the twentieth century, Sheffield has absorbed
the enormous outpouring of writing on the war,
and has provided a convincing re-appraisal,
primarily, on the role of the British Expeditionary
Force. Sheffield bravely tackles long-standing
beliefs and offers a re-evaluation of the BEF in
battle; a discussion on the evolution of the warwinning combined arms doctrine; a more positive
presentation of Sir Douglas Haig; one of the best
accounts in print of the all-important year of
battle, 1918; and several insightful chapters on
how the Great War has been remembered and
conceptualized over the twentieth century.
The opening line: “The First World War
was a tragic conflict, but it was neither futile
or meaningless,” sets the tone for the book.
As opposed to Mosier who presents the war
in absolutes, Sheffield is well aware of the
complexities and debates that have raged
unceasingly for decades. Throughout this work,
Sheffield sensibly lays out the historiography and
weaves his way through the contested ground.
There are no easy answers, and some of the
most difficult questions have involved the fighting
efficiency of the British armies. While Sheffield
describes the terrible slaughter of trench warfare,
he also explains why the British soldier continued
to endure more than four years of deprivation
and destruction. It was a war that the men of the
British Armies had to fight, in conditions on the
Western Front, for the most part, that were not
of their choosing, as the Germans were almost
always in the enviable position as defenders.
There is no doubt that the British soldiers
suffered in the steep learning curve of battle, but

by 1918, once those lessons had been learned,
they were the most efficient and effective fighting
force on the Western Front.
And what of Field Marshal Sir Douglas
Haig, the principal braying ass leading the lionlike British soldiers to their doom? That at
least is how he has often been portrayed over
the years. While Sheffield does not completely
rehabilitate Haig, he tries to put him in the
context of the war and the decision-making
system of the British High Command. Haig
may not have been a brilliant general, but a
survey of all generals, be they French, Russian,
German, or American, reveals that few if any
could be classified as geniuses. Does that mean
all the g enerals were donkeys? Perhaps a more
sympathetic assessment is needed to account
for the enormous technological and doctrinal
challenges facing all armies. Haig’s strategy of
attrition, which has been thoroughly condemned
over the years, indeed seemed senseless and
costly. It certainly resulted in terrible casualties.
But modern wars fought by million-men armies
of similar combat capability, and supported by
the full resources of a nation, or several nations,
will not result, with few exceptions, in a quick
victory or low kill rates.
Forgotten Victory is a challenging work that
drives the historiography in new directions,
forcing the reader to confront and redress longstanding beliefs about the Great War. Not all will
agree with Sheffield’s analysis, and this reviewer
is not persuaded, for instance, by his conclusion
of the Somme battles as being a British success
or at least less harmful to the British than the
Germans. But, there are enough provocative
and innovative ideas to make this book required
reading for any serious student of the Great
War. Moreover, Sheffield’s crisp writing style
and masterful synthesis of complex arguments
makes Forgotten Victory an ideal text for any
undergraduate course.
In the Great War, it was the British rather than
the Americans who made the greater contribution
to victory, and indeed, in this case, they continue
to do so in the Great War of Words.

Tim Cook is an historian at the Canadian
War Musuem.
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